Security isn't served by this system

Inter Lake editorial

"A plague on both our houses."

That could be the shared motto of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Of course, homeland security is no joking matter and neither are natural catastrophes such as Hurricane Katrina. In both cases, it is entirely possible the federal government will have to deal with real plagues spawned by either disaster or terrorism.

The problem is that the two agencies charged with protecting us have been hindered in doing their jobs effectively because of the bureaucratic reorganization that followed the Sept. 11 attacks.

The recent report by a special House inquiry into the response to Hurricane Katrina faulted Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff for being, as one AP story put it, "preoccupied with terror threats at the expense of preparing for natural disasters."

Chertoff denied the charge, of course, but the more fundamental question is why do we think there is a benefit to combining the two tasks in one bureaucracy?

Since 1979, FEMA had served effectively as the lead agency coordinating the federal response in natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes and tornadoes. The agency also played a role in such unnatural disasters as the Three Mile Island nuclear crisis and the contamination of Love Canal.

It made sense to have one agency in charge of responding to a variety of hazards, and FEMA had a reputation for efficiency.

Then came the terrorist attacks and a federal mandate to be better prepared for what everyone seemed to agree were inevitable terrorist attacks ranging from isolated bombings to chemical or nuclear attacks.

Homeland Security was created as a direct result of 9/11, and to centralize the government's response to terror attacks it was decided to put FEMA under the umbrella of Homeland Security.

It sounded like a good idea, but it wasn't.

It resulted in distractions from the primary mission for both agencies.

When Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, the response seemed ridiculously slow. FEMA was blamed for the loss of valuable time in responding to the human tragedy in New Orleans and elsewhere. Part of the explanation was that FEMA was now buried inside the bureaucracy of Homeland Security. New layers of red tape meant less accountability and less flexibility. What had been a model of efficiency turned into a national joke.

Meanwhile, the Department of Homeland Security was developing a reputation for incompetence.

No wonder. Homeland Security should fundamentally be about prevention of attacks on our country, not about how to provide ambulances in the aftermath of a storm.

Hurricanes are not a security issue any more than car accidents are. They deserve a response, but the responder should not necessarily be the agency in charge of security. Even if the cause of a disaster is terrorism, there is a fundamental difference between providing security to prevent a disaster and providing blankets in the wake of the disaster.

We think that fundamental difference needs to be acknowledged, and that the federal government should reassess how to best serve the American people, and how to care for them when something inevitably goes wrong.

Putting the Homeland Security chief in charge of the response to Katrina has meant that for the past six months his attention has been diverted from what we really want him to do - protect us from terrorists.

Maybe that explains why our borders are still not secure, why cargo containers coming through our ports get virtually no inspection, why subway systems in our great cities are undefended.

It explains it, but it does not excuse it.

So it's time to get smart and recognize that the missions of homeland security and disaster response are two very different things. In theory it sounded like a good idea to combine them in one Cabinet-level agency, but when the facts don't fit the theory, it's time to change the theory.

Our safety and well-being depend on it.